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think in abstract terms

  • 1 abstract

    1. adjective

    abstract noun — (Ling.) Abstraktum, das

    2. noun
    1) (summary) Zusammenfassung, die; Abstract, das (fachspr.); (of book) Inhaltsangabe, die
    2) (idea) Abstraktum, das
    3. transitive verb
    (remove) wegnehmen
    * * *
    ['æbstrækt] 1. adjective
    1) ((of a noun) referring to something which exists as an idea and which is not physically real: Truth, poverty and bravery are abstract nouns.) abstrakt
    2) ((of painting, sculpture etc) concerned with colour, shape, texture etc rather than showing things as they really appear: an abstract sketch of a vase of flowers.) abstrakt
    2. noun
    (a summary (of a book, article etc).) Zusammenfassung
    * * *
    ab·stract
    I. adj
    [ˈæbstrækt]
    abstrakt
    \abstract art/painting abstrakte Kunst/Malerei
    II. n
    [ˈæbstrækt]
    1. (summary) Zusammenfassung f
    2. LAW
    \abstract of title Eigentumsnachweis m
    3. (generalized form)
    ▪ the \abstract das Abstrakte
    in the \abstract abstrakt, theoretisch
    4. ART abstraktes Werk
    5. PHILOS Abstraktum nt fachspr
    III. vt
    [æbˈstrækt]
    ▪ to \abstract sth etw zusammenfassen
    ▪ to \abstract sth etw entwenden geh
    3. ( form: remove)
    ▪ to \abstract sth [from sth] etw [aus etw dat] entnehmen
    4. (consider separately)
    ▪ to \abstract sth [from sth] etw [von etw dat] trennen
    * * *
    I ['bstrkt]
    1. adj
    (all senses) abstrakt

    abstract noun — Abstraktum nt, abstraktes Substantiv

    2. n
    (kurze) Zusammenfassung II [b'strkt]
    vt
    abstrahieren; information entnehmen (from aus)
    * * *
    A adj [ˈæbstrækt; US auch æbˈstrækt] (adv abstractly)
    1. abstrakt:
    a) rein begrifflich, theoretisch:
    abstract concept ( oder idea) abstrakter Begriff;
    think in abstract terms abstrakt denken
    b) MATH unbenannt, absolut:
    c) rein, nicht angewandt (Wissenschaft)
    d) KUNST gegenstandslos (Gemälde etc)
    e) abstrus, schwer verständlich (Theorien etc)
    2. LING abstrakt (Ggs konkret):
    abstract noun → B 2
    B s [ˈæbstrækt]
    1. (das) Abstrakte:
    in the abstract abstrakt
    2. LING Abstraktum n, Begriffswort n
    3. (of) Auszug m (aus), Abriss m (gen), Inhaltsangabe f (gen), Übersicht f (über akk):
    a) Kontoauszug,
    b) Rechnungsauszug;
    abstract of title JUR Eigentumsnachweis m
    4. KUNST abstraktes Gemälde, abstrakte Plastik
    C v/t [æbˈstrækt]
    1. wegnehmen, entfernen
    2. abstrahieren ( from von), für sich oder (ab)gesondert betrachten
    3. euph mitgehen lassen, entwenden, stehlen
    4. CHEM destillieren
    5. [besonders US ˈæbstrækt]
    a) einen Auszug machen aus
    b) zusammenfassen
    abs. abk
    * * *
    1. adjective

    abstract noun — (Ling.) Abstraktum, das

    2. noun
    1) (summary) Zusammenfassung, die; Abstract, das (fachspr.); (of book) Inhaltsangabe, die
    2) (idea) Abstraktum, das
    3. transitive verb
    (remove) wegnehmen
    * * *
    adj.
    abstrakt adj.
    allgemein adj. n.
    Abriss -e m.
    Abstrakte n.
    Auszug -¨e m.
    Kurzbeschreibung f.
    Kurzdarstellung f.
    Zusammenfassung f. v.
    absondern v.
    abstrahieren v.
    einen Auszug machen von ausdr.
    entwenden v.

    English-german dictionary > abstract

  • 2 term

    1. noun
    1) (word expressing definite concept) [Fach]begriff, der

    legal/medical term — juristischer/medizinischer Fachausdruck

    term of reproach — Vorwurf, der

    in terms of money/politics — unter finanziellem/politischem Aspekt

    2) in pl. (conditions) Bedingungen

    he does everything on his own terms — er tut alles, wie er es für richtig hält

    come to or make terms [with somebody] — sich [mit jemandem] einigen

    come to terms [with each other] — sich einigen

    come to terms with something — (be able to accept something) mit etwas zurechtkommen; (resign oneself to something) sich mit etwas abfinden

    terms of reference — (Brit.) Aufgabenbereich, der

    3) in pl. (charges) Konditionen

    their terms are... — sie verlangen...

    4)

    in the short/long/medium term — kurz-/lang-/mittelfristig

    5) (Sch.) Halbjahr, das; (Univ.): (one of two/three/four divisions per year) Semester, das/Trimester, das/Quartal, das

    during term — während des Halbjahres/Semesters usw.

    out of term — in den Ferien

    end of term — Halbjahres-/Semesterende usw.

    6) (limited period) Zeitraum, der; (period of tenure)

    term [of office] — Amtszeit, die

    7) (period of imprisonment) Haftzeit, die
    8) in pl. (mode of expression) Worte

    praise in the highest terms — in den höchsten Tönen loben

    9) in pl. (relations)

    be on good/poor/friendly terms with somebody — mit jemandem auf gutem/schlechtem/freundschaftlichem Fuß stehen

    2. transitive verb
    * * *
    [tə:m] 1. noun
    1) (a (usually limited) period of time: a term of imprisonment; a term of office.) die Zeitdauer
    2) (a division of a school or university year: the autumn term.) das Semester
    3) (a word or expression: Myopia is a medical term for short-sightedness.) der Ausdruck
    •
    - academic.ru/112873/terms">terms
    2. verb
    (to name or call: That kind of painting is termed `abstract'.) bezeichnen als
    - come to terms
    - in terms of
    * * *
    [tɜ:m, AM tɜ:rm]
    I. n
    1. (of two) Semester nt; (of three) Trimester nt
    half-\term kurze Ferien, die zwischen den langen Ferien liegen, z.B. Pfingst-/Herbstferien
    2. (set duration of job) Amtszeit f
    \term of office Amtsperiode f, Amtszeit f
    3. (period of sentence)
    \term of imprisonment Haftdauer f
    prison \term Gefängnisstrafe f
    4. ECON ( form: duration of contract) Laufzeit f, Dauer f
    \term of a policy Vertragslaufzeit f
    5. no pl (anticipated date of birth) Geburtstermin m
    her last pregnancy went to \term bei ihrer letzten Schwangerschaft hat sie das Kind bis zum Schluss ausgetragen; (period)
    \term of pregnancy Schwangerschaft f
    6. (range) Dauer f
    in the long/medium/short \term lang-/mittel-/kurzfristig
    7. (phrase) Ausdruck m
    \term of abuse Schimpfwort nt
    \term of endearment Kosewort nt
    in layman's \terms einfach ausgedrückt
    to be on friendly \terms with sb mit jdm auf freundschaftlichem Fuß stehen
    generic \term Gattungsbegriff m
    in glowing \terms mit Begeisterung
    legal \term Rechtsbegriff m
    technical \term Fachausdruck m
    in no uncertain \terms unmissverständlich
    she told him what she thought in no uncertain \terms sie gab ihm unmissverständlich zu verstehen, was sie dachte
    II. vt
    ▪ to \term sth:
    I would \term his behaviour unacceptable ich würde sein Verhalten als inakzeptabel bezeichnen
    ▪ to \term sb [as] sth jdn als etw bezeichnen, jdn etw nennen
    * * *
    [tɜːm]
    1. n
    1) (= period of time) Dauer f, Zeitraum m; (of contract) Laufzeit f; (= limit) Frist f

    to set a term (of three years) for sth — etw (auf drei Jahre) befristen

    in the long/short term — auf lange/kurze Sicht

    at term (Fin) — bei Fälligkeit; (Med) zur rechten Zeit

    2) (SCH three in one year) Trimester nt; (four in one year) Vierteljahr nt, Quartal nt; (two in one year) Halbjahr nt; (UNIV) Semester nt

    end-of-term exam — Examen nt am Ende eines Trimesters etc

    during or in term(-time) — während der Schulzeit; (Univ) während des Semesters

    3) (= expression) Ausdruck m
    4) (MATH, LOGIC) Term m

    in terms of production we are doing well — was die Produktion betrifft, stehen wir gut da

    in terms of money — geldlich, finanziell

    5) pl (= conditions) Bedingungen pl

    terms of surrender/service/sale/payment — Kapitulations-/Arbeits-/Verkaufs-/Zahlungsbedingungen pl

    terms of reference (of committee etc) — Aufgabenbereich m; (of thesis etc) Themenbereich m

    to buy sth on credit/easy terms — etw auf Kredit/auf Raten kaufen

    not on any terms — unter gar keinen Umständen

    to accept sb on his/her own terms — jdn nehmen, wie er/sie ist

    6) termspl

    (= relations) to be on good/bad terms with sb — gut/nicht (gut) mit jdm auskommen

    2. vt
    nennen, bezeichnen
    * * *
    term [tɜːm; US tɜrm]
    A s
    1. ( besonders Fach)Ausdruck, Bezeichnung f:
    legal term juristischer Fachausdruck;
    term of abuse Schimpfwort n, Beleidigung f; → endearment, technical 2
    2. pl Ausdrucksweise f, Worte pl, Denkkategorien pl:
    in terms ausdrücklich, in Worten;
    praise sb in the highest terms jemanden in den höchsten Tönen loben;
    condemn sth in the strongest terms etwas schärfstens verurteilen;
    in no uncertain terms unmissverständlich, klipp und klar umg;
    a) in Form von (od gen),
    b) im Sinne von (od gen),
    c) hinsichtlich (gen), bezüglich (gen),
    d) vom Standpunkt (gen), von … her,
    e) verglichen mit, im Verhältnis zu;
    in terms of literature literarisch (betrachtet), vom Literarischen her;
    in terms of purchasing power in Kaufkraft umgerechnet;
    think in economic terms in wirtschaftlichen Kategorien denken;
    think in terms of money (nur) in Mark und Pfennig denken; → plain1 A 4
    3. pl Wortlaut m:
    be in the following terms folgendermaßen lauten
    4. a) Zeit f, Dauer f:
    term (of imprisonment) JUR Freiheitsstrafe f;
    term of office Amtszeit, -dauer, -periode f;
    for a term of four years für die Dauer von vier Jahren;
    he is too old to serve a second term er ist zu alt für eine zweite Amtsperiode,
    b) (Zahlungs- etc) Frist f:
    on term WIRTSCH auf Zeit;
    in the long term auf lange Sicht, langfristig gesehen;
    term deposit WIRTSCH Termingeld n, -einlage f;
    term insurance WIRTSCH Risikolebensversicherung f
    5. WIRTSCH
    a) Laufzeit f (eines Vertrags etc)
    b) Termin m:
    set a term einen Termin festsetzen;
    at term zum festgelegten Termin
    6. a) Br SCHULE, UNIV Trimester n
    b) US UNIV Semester n, SCHULE Halbjahr n
    7. JUR Sitzungsperiode f
    8. pl (Vertrags- etc)Bedingungen pl, Bestimmungen pl:
    terms of delivery WIRTSCH Liefer(ungs)bedingungen;
    terms of trade Austauschverhältnis n (im Außenhandel);
    on easy terms zu günstigen Bedingungen;
    on the terms that … unter der Bedingung, dass …;
    come to terms handelseinig werden, sich einigen ( beide:
    with mit);
    come to terms with sich abfinden mit;
    come to terms with the past die Vergangenheit bewältigen;
    come to terms with the future die Zukunft(sentwicklungen) akzeptieren;
    bring to terms jemanden zur Annahme der Bedingungen bringen; → equal A 10, reference A 3
    9. pl Preise pl, Honorar n:
    what are your terms? was verlangen Sie?;
    I’ll give you special terms ich mache Ihnen einen Sonderpreis
    10. pl Beziehungen pl, Verhältnis n (zwischen Personen):
    be on good (bad, friendly) terms with auf gutem (schlechtem, freundschaftlichem) Fuße stehen mit;
    they are not on speaking terms sie sprechen nicht (mehr) miteinander
    11. pl gute Beziehungen pl:
    be on terms with sb mit jemandem gutstehen
    12. MATH
    a) Glied n:
    term of a sum Summand m (hinzuzuzählende Zahl),
    b) Ausdruck m (einer Gleichung)
    c) Geometrie: Grenze f (einer Linie)
    13. Logik: Begriff m: → contradiction 2, major A 5 a
    14. ARCH Grenzstein m, -säule f
    15. PHYSIOL
    a) errechneter Entbindungstermin:
    carry to (full) term ein Kind austragen;
    go ( oder be taken) to term ausgetragen werden;
    she is near her term sie steht kurz vor der Niederkunft,
    b) obs Menstruation f
    B v/t (be)nennen, bezeichnen als:
    he may be what is termed an egghead but … er mag das sein, was man einen Eierkopf nennt, aber …
    * * *
    1. noun
    1) (word expressing definite concept) [Fach]begriff, der

    legal/medical term — juristischer/medizinischer Fachausdruck

    term of reproach — Vorwurf, der

    in terms of money/politics — unter finanziellem/politischem Aspekt

    2) in pl. (conditions) Bedingungen

    he does everything on his own terms — er tut alles, wie er es für richtig hält

    come to or make terms [with somebody] — sich [mit jemandem] einigen

    come to terms [with each other] — sich einigen

    come to terms with something — (be able to accept something) mit etwas zurechtkommen; (resign oneself to something) sich mit etwas abfinden

    terms of reference — (Brit.) Aufgabenbereich, der

    3) in pl. (charges) Konditionen

    their terms are... — sie verlangen...

    4)

    in the short/long/medium term — kurz-/lang-/mittelfristig

    5) (Sch.) Halbjahr, das; (Univ.): (one of two/three/four divisions per year) Semester, das/Trimester, das/Quartal, das

    during term — während des Halbjahres/Semesters usw.

    end of term — Halbjahres-/Semesterende usw.

    6) (limited period) Zeitraum, der; (period of tenure)

    term [of office] — Amtszeit, die

    7) (period of imprisonment) Haftzeit, die
    9) in pl. (relations)

    be on good/poor/friendly terms with somebody — mit jemandem auf gutem/schlechtem/freundschaftlichem Fuß stehen

    2. transitive verb
    * * *
    (school) n.
    Semester - n. n.
    Ausdruck -¨e m.
    Bedingung f.
    Begriff -e m.
    Frist -en f.
    Laufzeit -en f.
    Termin -e m.

    English-german dictionary > term

  • 3 Knowledge

       It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)
       It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.
       But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)
       Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).
       Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])
       Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....
       This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)
       Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)
       Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)
       "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.
       Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge

  • 4 Thinking

       But what then am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, [conceives], affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. (Descartes, 1951, p. 153)
       I have been trying in all this to remove the temptation to think that there "must be" a mental process of thinking, hoping, wishing, believing, etc., independent of the process of expressing a thought, a hope, a wish, etc.... If we scrutinize the usages which we make of "thinking," "meaning," "wishing," etc., going through this process rids us of the temptation to look for a peculiar act of thinking, independent of the act of expressing our thoughts, and stowed away in some particular medium. (Wittgenstein, 1958, pp. 41-43)
       Analyse the proofs employed by the subject. If they do not go beyond observation of empirical correspondences, they can be fully explained in terms of concrete operations, and nothing would warrant our assuming that more complex thought mechanisms are operating. If, on the other hand, the subject interprets a given correspondence as the result of any one of several possible combinations, and this leads him to verify his hypotheses by observing their consequences, we know that propositional operations are involved. (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 279)
       In every age, philosophical thinking exploits some dominant concepts and makes its greatest headway in solving problems conceived in terms of them. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers construed knowledge, knower, and known in terms of sense data and their association. Descartes' self-examination gave classical psychology the mind and its contents as a starting point. Locke set up sensory immediacy as the new criterion of the real... Hobbes provided the genetic method of building up complex ideas from simple ones... and, in another quarter, still true to the Hobbesian method, Pavlov built intellect out of conditioned reflexes and Loeb built life out of tropisms. (S. Langer, 1962, p. 54)
       Experiments on deductive reasoning show that subjects are influenced sufficiently by their experience for their reasoning to differ from that described by a purely deductive system, whilst experiments on inductive reasoning lead to the view that an understanding of the strategies used by adult subjects in attaining concepts involves reference to higher-order concepts of a logical and deductive nature. (Bolton, 1972, p. 154)
       There are now machines in the world that think, that learn and create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until-in the visible future-the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied. (Newell & Simon, quoted in Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 138)
       But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition... whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action.... I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the "I have to make a cloak," is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)
       It is well to remember that when philosophy emerged in Greece in the sixth century, B.C., it did not burst suddenly out of the Mediterranean blue. The development of societies of reasoning creatures-what we call civilization-had been a process to be measured not in thousands but in millions of years. Human beings became civilized as they became reasonable, and for an animal to begin to reason and to learn how to improve its reasoning is a long, slow process. So thinking had been going on for ages before Greece-slowly improving itself, uncovering the pitfalls to be avoided by forethought, endeavoring to weigh alternative sets of consequences intellectually. What happened in the sixth century, B.C., is that thinking turned round on itself; people began to think about thinking, and the momentous event, the culmination of the long process to that point, was in fact the birth of philosophy. (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, p. xi)
       The way to look at thought is not to assume that there is a parallel thread of correlated affects or internal experiences that go with it in some regular way. It's not of course that people don't have internal experiences, of course they do; but that when you ask what is the state of mind of someone, say while he or she is performing a ritual, it's hard to believe that such experiences are the same for all people involved.... The thinking, and indeed the feeling in an odd sort of way, is really going on in public. They are really saying what they're saying, doing what they're doing, meaning what they're meaning. Thought is, in great part anyway, a public activity. (Geertz, quoted in J. Miller, 1983, pp. 202-203)
       Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. (Einstein, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 17)
       What, in effect, are the conditions for the construction of formal thought? The child must not only apply operations to objects-in other words, mentally execute possible actions on them-he must also "reflect" those operations in the absence of the objects which are replaced by pure propositions. Thus, "reflection" is thought raised to the second power. Concrete thinking is the representation of a possible action, and formal thinking is the representation of a representation of possible action.... It is not surprising, therefore, that the system of concrete operations must be completed during the last years of childhood before it can be "reflected" by formal operations. In terms of their function, formal operations do not differ from concrete operations except that they are applied to hypotheses or propositions [whose logic is] an abstract translation of the system of "inference" that governs concrete operations. (Piaget, quoted in Minsky, 1986, p. 237)
       [E]ven a human being today (hence, a fortiori, a remote ancestor of contemporary human beings) cannot easily or ordinarily maintain uninterrupted attention on a single problem for more than a few tens of seconds. Yet we work on problems that require vastly more time. The way we do that (as we can observe by watching ourselves) requires periods of mulling to be followed by periods of recapitulation, describing to ourselves what seems to have gone on during the mulling, leading to whatever intermediate results we have reached. This has an obvious function: namely, by rehearsing these interim results... we commit them to memory, for the immediate contents of the stream of consciousness are very quickly lost unless rehearsed.... Given language, we can describe to ourselves what seemed to occur during the mulling that led to a judgment, produce a rehearsable version of the reaching-a-judgment process, and commit that to long-term memory by in fact rehearsing it. (Margolis, 1987, p. 60)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Thinking

  • 5 Language

       Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)
       It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)
       It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)
       Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)
       It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)
       [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]
       Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it
       Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another
       LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)
       We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)
       We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.
       The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)
       9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language
       The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)
       It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)
       In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)
       In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)
       [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)
       he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.
       The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)
       The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.
       But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)
       The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)
        t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)
       A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)
       Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)
       It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)
       First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....
       Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)
       If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)
        23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction
       Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)
       By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)
       Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language

  • 6 Memory

       To what extent can we lump together what goes on when you try to recall: (1) your name; (2) how you kick a football; and (3) the present location of your car keys? If we use introspective evidence as a guide, the first seems an immediate automatic response. The second may require constructive internal replay prior to our being able to produce a verbal description. The third... quite likely involves complex operational responses under the control of some general strategy system. Is any unitary search process, with a single set of characteristics and inputoutput relations, likely to cover all these cases? (Reitman, 1970, p. 485)
       [Semantic memory] Is a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and referents, about relations among them, and about rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations. Semantic memory does not register perceptible properties of inputs, but rather cognitive referents of input signals. (Tulving, 1972, p. 386)
       The mnemonic code, far from being fixed and unchangeable, is structured and restructured along with general development. Such a restructuring of the code takes place in close dependence on the schemes of intelligence. The clearest indication of this is the observation of different types of memory organisation in accordance with the age level of a child so that a longer interval of retention without any new presentation, far from causing a deterioration of memory, may actually improve it. (Piaget & Inhelder, 1973, p. 36)
       4) The Logic of Some Memory Theorization Is of Dubious Worth in the History of Psychology
       If a cue was effective in memory retrieval, then one could infer it was encoded; if a cue was not effective, then it was not encoded. The logic of this theorization is "heads I win, tails you lose" and is of dubious worth in the history of psychology. We might ask how long scientists will puzzle over questions with no answers. (Solso, 1974, p. 28)
       We have iconic, echoic, active, working, acoustic, articulatory, primary, secondary, episodic, semantic, short-term, intermediate-term, and longterm memories, and these memories contain tags, traces, images, attributes, markers, concepts, cognitive maps, natural-language mediators, kernel sentences, relational rules, nodes, associations, propositions, higher-order memory units, and features. (Eysenck, 1977, p. 4)
       The problem with the memory metaphor is that storage and retrieval of traces only deals [ sic] with old, previously articulated information. Memory traces can perhaps provide a basis for dealing with the "sameness" of the present experience with previous experiences, but the memory metaphor has no mechanisms for dealing with novel information. (Bransford, McCarrell, Franks & Nitsch, 1977, p. 434)
       7) The Results of a Hundred Years of the Psychological Study of Memory Are Somewhat Discouraging
       The results of a hundred years of the psychological study of memory are somewhat discouraging. We have established firm empirical generalisations, but most of them are so obvious that every ten-year-old knows them anyway. We have made discoveries, but they are only marginally about memory; in many cases we don't know what to do with them, and wear them out with endless experimental variations. We have an intellectually impressive group of theories, but history offers little confidence that they will provide any meaningful insight into natural behavior. (Neisser, 1978, pp. 12-13)
       A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the mean ing of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept. (Rumelhart, 1980, p. 34)
       Memory appears to be constrained by a structure, a "syntax," perhaps at quite a low level, but it is free to be variable, deviant, even erratic at a higher level....
       Like the information system of language, memory can be explained in part by the abstract rules which underlie it, but only in part. The rules provide a basic competence, but they do not fully determine performance. (Campbell, 1982, pp. 228, 229)
       When people think about the mind, they often liken it to a physical space, with memories and ideas as objects contained within that space. Thus, we speak of ideas being in the dark corners or dim recesses of our minds, and of holding ideas in mind. Ideas may be in the front or back of our minds, or they may be difficult to grasp. With respect to the processes involved in memory, we talk about storing memories, of searching or looking for lost memories, and sometimes of finding them. An examination of common parlance, therefore, suggests that there is general adherence to what might be called the spatial metaphor. The basic assumptions of this metaphor are that memories are treated as objects stored in specific locations within the mind, and the retrieval process involves a search through the mind in order to find specific memories....
       However, while the spatial metaphor has shown extraordinary longevity, there have been some interesting changes over time in the precise form of analogy used. In particular, technological advances have influenced theoretical conceptualisations.... The original Greek analogies were based on wax tablets and aviaries; these were superseded by analogies involving switchboards, gramophones, tape recorders, libraries, conveyor belts, and underground maps. Most recently, the workings of human memory have been compared to computer functioning... and it has been suggested that the various memory stores found in computers have their counterparts in the human memory system. (Eysenck, 1984, pp. 79-80)
       Primary memory [as proposed by William James] relates to information that remains in consciousness after it has been perceived, and thus forms part of the psychological present, whereas secondary memory contains information about events that have left consciousness, and are therefore part of the psychological past. (Eysenck, 1984, p. 86)
       Once psychologists began to study long-term memory per se, they realized it may be divided into two main categories.... Semantic memories have to do with our general knowledge about the working of the world. We know what cars do, what stoves do, what the laws of gravity are, and so on. Episodic memories are largely events that took place at a time and place in our personal history. Remembering specific events about our own actions, about our family, and about our individual past falls into this category. With amnesia or in aging, what dims... is our personal episodic memories, save for those that are especially dear or painful to us. Our knowledge of how the world works remains pretty much intact. (Gazzaniga, 1988, p. 42)
       The nature of memory... provides a natural starting point for an analysis of thinking. Memory is the repository of many of the beliefs and representations that enter into thinking, and the retrievability of these representations can limit the quality of our thought. (Smith, 1990, p. 1)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Memory

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